Symmetry, Structure, and Spacetime
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Table of contents
- Cover
- Prefacev
- Acknowledgementsix
- Contentsxi
- Chapter 1. Interpretation and Formalism1
- 1.1 Interpretation and ontology1
- 1.2 Symmetry and structure11
- 1.3 Permutation symmetry and possibility15
- 1.4 A very brief primer on classical and quantum systems19
- Chapter 2. Space and Time in the Leibniz-Clarke Debate23
- 2.1 Substantivalism versus relationalism24
- 2.2 Inflation versus deflation31
- 2.3 Leibniz versus Clarke32
- 2.4 Sophisticated substantivalism and unsophisticated relationalism35
- 2.5 Looking ahead to the modern debate39
- Chapter 3. The Interpretation of Gauge Symmetries45
- 3.1 Maxwellian electromagnetism46
- 3.2 Aspects of gauge theories50
- 3.3 Interpretive problems of gauge theories56
- 3.4 Why gauge?69
- Chapter 4. Spacetime in General Relativity73
- 4.1 Manifold substantivalism74
- 4.2 Models and worlds78
- 4.3 The hole argument: The view from gauge theory81
- Chapter 5. Responding to the Hole Problem89
- 5.1 Troubles with determinism90
- 5.2 The modalist turn98
- 5.3 Varieties of relationalism114
- Chapter 6. What Is an Observable in General Relativity?127
- 6.1 Defining observables130
- 6.2 What is the significance of relational localization?134
- Chapter 7. Time, Change, and Gauge139
- 7.1 Holes and gauge: A brief recap139
- 7.2 What is the problem of time?141
- 7.3 A snapshot of the philosophical debate144
- 7.4 Catalogue of responses153
- 7.5 Enter structuralism165
- 7.6 Quantum gravity and spacetime ontology168
- Chapter 8. Symmetry and Ontology173
- 8.1 To reduce or not reduce?173
- 8.2 Geometric mechanics and possibility spaces175
- 8.3 Four views on reduction178
- Chapter 9. Structuralism and Symmetry189
- 9.1 Three types of structuralism191
- 9.2 To take objects or to leave them?197
- 9.3 Surplus, semantic universalism and minimal structuralism203
- 9.4 Minimal structuralism is not constructive empiricism212
- References217
- Subject Index227
In this book Rickles considers several interpretative difficulties raised by gauge-type symmetries (those that correspond to no change in physical state). The ubiquity of such symmetries in modern physics renders them an urgent topic in philosophy of physics. Rickles focuses on spacetime physics, and in particular classical and quantum general relativity. Here the problems posed are at their most pathological, involving the apparent disappearance of spacetime! Rickles argues that both traditional ontological positions should be replaced by a structuralist account according to which relational structure is what the physics is about.
· Unified treatment of gauge symmetries and their relationship to ontology in physics
· Brings philosophy of space and time into step with developments in modern physics
· Argues against the received view on the implications of symmetries in physics
· Provides elementary treatments of technical issues
· Illustrates a novel defense of structuralism
· Unified treatment of gauge symmetries and their relationship to ontology in physics
· Brings philosophy of space and time into step with developments in modern physics
· Argues against the received view on the implications of symmetries in physics
· Provides elementary treatments of technical issues
· Illustrates a novel defense of structuralism